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SEVENTEEN 
Sartre's second or dialectical ethics 
Thomas C. Anderson 
When Jean-Paul Sartre died in 1980, some in the French press called 
him the moral conscience of post-war France. Jn fact, in an interview he 
gave towards the end of his life, Sartre himself stated that he had always 
been a "moral philosopher" and also that he had attempted to write 
three different ethics in his lifetime. Of course, ethics was just one of 
his many interests. His exceptional talent led him to write plays, novels 
and short stories, works on psychology and political theory, ontology, 
philosophy of history, philosophy of art and philosophical biographies. 
Nevertheless, I believe that his interests in moral philosophy and moral 
values were at the centre of his life and constituted the underlying sub-
structure (to use a Marxian term) of his life and works. One reason I say 
this is because almost from the beginning his ethics was humanistic in 
that be identified the goal of morality and the goal of human existence. 
This chapter is primarily devoted to what Sartre himself designated 
as his second "realistic" ethics, thereby contrasting it with his first "ide-
alistic" ethics. The latter was the one be promised at the end of Being 
and Nothingness and worked on for well over a decade. He eventually 
came to believe that this ethics, based on the ontological categories set 
forth in that early phenomenological ontology, was too far removed 
from the real world in which human beings existed. Although this 
chapter focuses on his second ethics, the fact is that in the writings of 
Sartre relatively few pages are devoted to it. Almost the only source we 
have is 165 pages of handwritten notes that were a lecture he gave in 
Rome in 1964. But even if we had more, it would still be very important 
that we understand a number of the basic concepts and ontological 
foundations of the first ethics in order to appreciate why he became so 
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dissatisfied with it that he set it aside and attempted the second. As we 
shall see, there are significant and radical differences between these two 
moralities and they are rooted in the fundamenta lly different ontologies 
on which they a re based. 
Ontological foundations 
From his earliest philosophical writings, Sartre sharply divided a ll real-
ity into just two realms. This culminated in his distinction between 
being-for-itself and being-in-itself, set forth in detail in his major wo rk 
of phenomenological onto logy Being and Nothingness in 1943. Being-
for-itself, human consciousness, is described as no n-substantial and 
contentless {"total emptiness"; BNl : xxxii; BN2: 12). It is no thing but 
a web of aU kinds of intentional conscious acts in relation to objects. It 
is "all activity, all spontaneity" (BNl : xxxv; BN2: 15), "self-determin-
ing", "self-activated", "cause of itself" and therefore, free (BN1/BN2: 
introduction). Being-in-itself, on the other hand, is described as passive 
and inert. It is thoroughly identical with itself and filled with being. It 
is nothing but a full positivity o f being, which contains no nonbeing 
and so "does not enter into any connection with what is not itself". It 
simply "is itself ", "glued to itself" and so " isolated in its being~·. Thus 
being-for-itself and being-in-itseU are "absolutely separated regions of 
being", Sartre asserts (BN1: xxxix; BN2: 19). O ne consequence of their 
separation is that being-for-itself is totally free from any influence of 
being-in-itse lf. Human consciousness is not affected by the being it is 
aware of; its relation to be ing is tota lly negative. 
Sartre implies that his definitions of the characteristics of these two 
regions of being are the result of a phenomenological analysis, that is, 
are conclusions of careful reflection on and descriptions of the phenom-
ena of consciousness and of its objects. I must confess that I consider 
that very implausible. But what is even more problematic in his analysis 
is that throughout Being and Nothingness he often without explanation 
simply equates being-for-itself, human consciousness, with human real-
ity itself or " man" and freedom. Accordingly, when we turn to his most 
extensive treatment of freedo m and its relation to other things (part 4 ), 
we find Sartre insisting not only o n the total freedom of consciousness 
but also o f human reality! H e argues that consciousness/human reality 
is free because it can always transcend what is and grasp what is not, for 
example, non-existent goals or ideals. Every conscious act, he says, " is 
a projectio n of the for-itself towards what is not, and what is can in no 
way determine by itself what is not" (BNl: 435-6; BN2: 457). And he 
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proceeds to identi fy this freedom with the freedom of human reality: 
my freedom "is very exactly the stuff o f my being ... freedom is not a 
being; it is the being of m an" (BNl: 439). H e minimizes to the point of 
denial any limitations o f human freedom referring to it as "absolute", 
"to tal", " infinite", and "without limits" (BNl: 435-41 , 530-31, 549). 
"M an can not be sometimes slave and sometimes free", he asserts, "he is 
wholly and forever free or he is not free at all" (BN1: 441 ; BN2: 463). 
Such a view of human reality and human freedom is fo r the later 
Sartre, the author of Critique of Dialect ical Reason volume 1 (1960b, 
1976a), far too "abstract" and "irreal" (hjs words). It is not the real free-
dom of concrete human beings who are thoroughly immersed in and 
conditioned by the natural and social worlds, which worlds inevitably 
restrict them to "a strictly Jimjted field of possibilities". A majo r reason 
Sartre labels his second ethics "realistic" is because it accurately recog-
nizes the dialectical character of human relations to the world. That 
is, there is mutual interaction and causation between humans and the 
world. This occurs because in the Critique and later works, human real-
ity is described no t simply as a &ee consciousness (o r being-for-itselO 
sepa rate from nature o r the things of the world but as a completely 
material o rganism. Sartre characterizes his position in the Critique as 
a "monism of materiality" and a "realistic materialism" (Sartre 1976a: 
29, 181). What distingujshes the human o rganism from all o thers, he 
says, is its consciousness, which, however, he no longer describes as 
non-substantial o r pure spontaneous self-determining activity. Rather 
man is "wholly matter", he insists (ibid.: 180). We are made up of the 
very same physical atoms and molecules as any other material thing. 
Like any organism the human is a synthesis of parts that is threatened by 
all the things in the world which can dissolve or destroy it. Furthermore, 
the organism's maintenance and growth is thoroughly dependent on 
and dialectically conditioned by the material world and other material 
organisms to satisfy its many needs. Indeed, it is the organism's urge 
to satisfy its needs that initiates all of its act ions on its environment. 
Yet human conscio usness is still considered by Sartre to be free 
because of its ability to go beyond o r transcend every situation. It can 
in his words "negate", "deny", "wrench itself from" what is present in 
any given situation towards what is not - such as a not now existing 
goal o r imaginary ideal (ibid.: 70--71, 83-8, 97, 422, 549). As we noted, 
however, human freedo m is restricted by the natural and social mil ieu 
in which it exists, sometimes severely. 
To conclude this section, let us note that since Sartre's early and his 
later ontologies have such fundamentaJiy different conceptio ns of the 
nature of human reality and its relations to the world, it will not be 
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surprising that Sartre's first and second moralities which are based on 
these respective ontologies will themselves differ significantly. As a first 
step toward grasping these differences, I tum next to consider what 
each ethics takes to be the ultimate foundation of human values and 
goals. After all every ethics, whatever its ontological base, is concerned 
with values (BNl: 626; BN2: 646). 
The nature and source of values 
In Being and Nothingness Sartre states unequivocally that the human 
being "is the being by whom values exist" and more precisely that "his 
freedom [is] ... the unique source of values" (BNl: 62 7; BN2: 64 7). He 
is equally clear on the devastating impact this position has on ethics. If 
human freedom makes values exist, then this "paralyses" and "relatives" 
ethics, for it means that no values exit objectively or apart from human 
freedom. Rather, whatever one freely chooses to value, whether love 
or hate, freedom or slavery, torture or kindness, will be of value. "My 
freedom is the sole foundation of values", he writes, and so "nothing, 
absolutely nothing justifies me in adopting this or that particular value, 
this or that particu lar scale of values" (BNl: 38; BN2: 62). I cannot 
appeal to any objective values to justify my actions for there are none 
and any morality which tries to set forth objective norms of human 
conduct is doomed from the start. 
Sartre's argument for this position is as follows. Values are expe-
rienced as imperatives or norms. As such they are not being but are 
"beyond being"; they are not something that is but something which 
· should be brought into being. As imperatives and norms, values are 
experienced not as something real but as requirements and demands to 
be made real. Since values are beyond what is, their reality can be due 
only to a being that is able to transcend what is and posit what is not. 
Such a being is, of course, human reality and values are precisely that 
towards which every human being surpasses what is. 
As in the first ethics, Sartre in his second or dialectkal ethics consid-
ers values to be imperatives or norms or obligations that we experience 
as requiring our adherence. They are not descriptions of facts but pre-
scriptions for conduct (Sartre 1964b: 41, 65, 69, 72). In contrast to his 
first ethics, however, in his dialectical ethics Sartre insists that there is 
a "given", "assigned", even "imposed" (his words: ibid.: 67, 98, 145) 
character to moral values and goals. That is because he now believes that 
"the root of morality is in need" (ibid.: 100; see also 87-98). Needs, he 
explains, are not just a lack of something, they are felt exigencies, felt 
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(at least obscurely) demands to be satisfied. Because we have various 
needs which demand their satisfaction, we experience certain objects 
(for example, food, health, knowledge and love) to be valuable and thus 
to be things we feel we should obtain. In other words, because we are 
specific lcinds of organisms with specific needs, certain kinds of objects 
are necessary to satisfy these needs. Since we do not freely choose the 
needs we have, we cannot freely choose the kind of things that fulfil 
those needs. It is not up to an individual's free choice, for example, 
whether oxygen or knowledge or love fulfil his or her needs and are 
thereby of value for them. Thus, by making human needs rather than 
human freedom the source of moral values, Sartre's second dialectical 
ethics grants them a certain objectivity, that is, an independence from 
human freedom - for it can neither create nor remove their value. 
Oxygen and love have value for me whether I choose them to have 
it or not. And, again, because they are of value I experience them as 
something that should be attained. 
The goal of ethics 
The foregoing considerations naturally lead to a consideration of the 
primary value or ultimate goal Sartre posits for each of his two morali-
ties. In this section we will also discuss the reasons (in other words, 
the justification) he offers in each ethics for proposing the respective 
goal he does. 
The goal of Sartre's first ethics is freedom. He speaks of it as "the 
reign of human freedom" (Sartre 1988: 198), which is also the dty of 
ends where each person treats the other as an end. This city is identi-
fied with a socialist, classless society "where freedom is valued as such 
and willed as such" (Sartre 1992: 418; 1988: 192). In one sense this is 
perfectly straightforward because, as we have seen, at this time Sartre 
often identified human reality with freedom. To propose freedom as 
our highest value is simply to propose human existence as our highest 
value. There is a serious problem with doing so, however, namely, Sar-
tre's total subjectivism when it comes to values. If all values are human 
creations why not propose that humans value power or pleasure or, for 
that matter, world domination or destruction as their supreme goaV 
value? Why single out freedom? 
Sartre's cryptic argument in his lecture Existentialism and Human-
ism involves an appeal to "strict consistency" (Sartre 1973: 51), both 
logical consistency and consistency with reality. Since human freedom is 
the only source of value in Sartre's universe, it is logical and consistent 
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with the way things are that it be chosen as one's primary value. Once I 
realize that any value I confer on anything {such as my and others' lives, 
socialism, pleasure) comes from my freedom, the rational thing to do 
is to first and foremost value that freedom. It would be both logically 
inconsistent and inconsistent with the way things are not to do so. I 
must say that I believe Sartre's argument is a good one- but only if one 
first chooses to confer value on logical consistency and consistency with 
rea.lity. Since in his early ontology, nothing possesses any intrinsic or 
objective value, there can be no logical or moral requirement for one 
to choose to value cons.istency. That choice simply cannot be justified 
without begging the question. 
Even if one overlooks that problem, it remains very unclear what 
exactly it means to choose freedom as one's highest value and goal. 
Removing obstacles and limitations to freedom is one thing but what 
is liberated freedom for- for more freedom - for who or what ? Surely 
not for just anyone and anything. Sartre clearly supports the oppressed 
and wretched of the earth, not their oppressors. But his justifica6on for 
that preference remains unclear. Actually, this criticism is Sartre's own 
complaint that his first ethics was too abstract and irreaJ {idealistic). 
The goal of the second, dialectical ethics is significantly more real 
and richer in content. RecaJI that in this ethics Sartre maintains that all 
values arise not from human freedom but from human m:c:ds. Given 
this connection it is not surprising that the ultimate value and goal of 
this ethics is not a vague freedom but human fulfilment, that is, the 
satisfaction of human needs, also caJied "human p lenitude ... the fu lly 
alive organism" and "integral man" (Sartre 1964b: 55, 95). Of course, 
human fu 1 filment does demand the attainment of freedom, our need for 
freedom is certainly one o f our most fundamental needs, but a human 
organism has many other important needs. Sartre mentions our basic 
needs for protein, for vitamjos, for life itself. H e especiaJiy emphasizes 
our needs for knowledge, for culture, and for the love and valuation of 
others, as well as for a mearungfullife (ibid.: 63, 66, 77, 81, 97-101, 
132-5, 164). Because the goal of his dialectical ethics has far more con-
tent than the abstract freedom of his first ethics, it is, he suggests, able to 
be more specific about the type of acts or policies that are morally desir-
able-namely, those which promote the fulfilment of the varied needs of 
the human organism. Accordingly, in the second ethics Sartre states that 
he is attempting to set forth not an abstract morality but one that is also 
a praxis in the world, that is, a moral theory that can put forward both 
the ultimate value which human beings should seek {namely, human 
fulfilment) and also suggest , at least in general, what should be done to 
our particular capitalistic social, economic and political structures to 
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achieve that end. Morality is something lived, he asserts, and at bottom 
it may be that morality and politics are one and the same. 
In works after the Rome lecture, especiaJly those after the French 
student and worker uprisings of 1968, Sartre argues for a society with-
out hierarchies or classes, that is, one without power concentrated in 
an elite few. Instead of a ruling class, or state, he wants complete equal-
ity, a government by the people in the fullest sense. This will require 
the abolition of the division of labour, which, he believes, gives rise 
to narrow specialization and class distinctions. All people should have 
the right to participate in the economic, social and political govern-
ance of their country through "organs of decentralized power in work 
and in the entire social domain" (Sartre 1974c: 108). In the economic 
sphere these organs would involve collective ownership and manage-
ment of the means of production, such as, the factories, mjnes, media, 
banks and other social-economic institutions. In the political sphere, 
Sartre advocates direct democracy, a society where the masses unite 
to express their wishes effectively. Even if a direct democracy takes a 
representative form, he wants a new system in which, for example, a 
representative elected by 5,000 people would be "nothing other than 
5,000 persons; he must find the means for himself to be these 5,000 
people" (ibid.: 307). Direct democracy would involve "popular" courts, 
that is, a judiciary chosen by the people, simjJar to those that arose in 
France in the late 1960s. At that time workers in factories and mines set 
up people's courts and publicly staged trials of their bosses and owners 
(Sartre participated in some of those courts). 
Even in a direct democracy the implementation of policies may be 
the task of a smaller number of experts. But those experts must always 
be guided by the masses and return to them to make certain of their 
support. Even though he continues to refer to his ideal as socialism 
during this period, it is clearly a decentralized, debureaucratized and 
democratized version. And, the major advice Sartre offers to achieve 
this socialism is that one must join with the oppressed masses in their 
moral fight for liberation. 
FinaJly, let me point out that what Sartre wants for his dialectical 
ethics, an ethics that is also a politics, would require detailed study 
of the socio-economic-political structures of the society in which we 
live - a gigantic task that would take the collaboration of many disci-
plines. That is the kind of thing he himself attempted to some degree 
in his analyses of French colonialism in Algiers, the Soviet Union and 
Stalinism in the twentieth century, French history in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the French Indochina and Vietnam wars, and the 
Czechoslovakian spring to mention just a few. 
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We still need to address the justification Sartre offers for proposing 
the fu lfi lment of human needs or integral man as the ultimate value and 
goaJ of his second ethics. T he answer lies in the ontological structure, 
the needs, of the human organism: "Need posits man as his own end" 
(Sartre 1964b: 100), he writes. In the Rome lecture Sartre cryptically 
cites Marx who, he says, states that "need does not necessitate any justi-
fication " (ibid.: 98). The very fact that our needs demand to be satisfied 
makes their satisfaction our primary value and goal. We do not need 
to come up with reasons to justify seeking that goal which is required 
by our needs. Indeed, we are not free to decide what our ultimate end 
and primary value is. We are organisms with needs and so our ultimate 
end/value, human fulfilment, is "given", "assigned", even "imposed" 
on us, Sartre states (ibid.: 97-8). We do not need, nor can we find, any 
reason for valuing this goaJ other than the fact our needs require it. I 
believe this is what Sartre means when he cites another statement of 
Marx, "need is its own reason for its satisfaction" (ibid. : 97). It simply 
does not make sense to ask for reasons why we should choose human 
fulfilment as our ultimate value/goal. To demand such reasons is to seek 
what cannot be given, since there is no value/goal more fundamental 
than human fulfilment to w hich one could appeal to justify choosing it. 
Human relations 
One of the most important human needs that Sartre cites - especially 
in his last major work, The Family Idiot (Sartre 1971-2) - is for the 
affection and approval of other people. His early view of human rela-
tionships, he complained, was far too negative and too individualistic. 
In Being and Nothingness he minimized the power of human beings 
to affect each other and stressed instead the complete responsibility of 
each individual fo r his or her Life. He also looked upon other people 
primarily as dangers to one's individual freedom and in confl ict or 
potentially in conflict with me. "The essence of the relations between 
consciousnesses", he wrote, "is conflict". He a lso insisted t hat one can 
relate to another o nly as a free subject to an alienated object or vice 
versa.: "one must either transcend [objectify] the other or allow oneself 
to be transcended [objectified] by him" (BN1: 429; BN2: 451). 
I must hasten to add, however, that his early, posthumously published 
Notebooks for an Ethics (Sartre 1983b, 1992) shows clearly that Sartre 
moved very quickly beyond this negative position even in his first eth-
ics. In Notebooks, which were written in the late 1940s, he stresses the 
importance of intersubjective relations of "authentic" love, friendship 
and generosity and makes it clear that the conflictual relations presented 
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in Being and Nothingness were never meant to be taken as the only pos-
sible human relationships. In an explicit reference to that early work 
he asserts that one is able to transform the "hell" of human relations 
described there (Sartre 1992: 9, 20, 499) and that human beings can 
relate to each other primarily as subject to subject (ibid.: 418, 500). 
Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, Sartre's later work, the 
Critique of Dialectical Reason (and even the somewhat earlier Saint 
Genet) provide ample testimony to his recognition of the dialectic in 
history, in this case the tremendous impact human beings and their 
social structures have on each other. In fact, he admits that others 
through the social structures they build may Jimit the concrete free-
dom of many humans to almost zero- as in colonialization or slavery. 
Accordingly, Sartre repeatedly urges human beings to jo in together in 
groups in order to most effectively control the socio-economic-political 
systems they create so that they can be directed to the fulfilment of all, 
that is, the satisfaction of the needs of all 
Sartre's emphasis on human interdependency is used in another work 
of his first ethics, Existentialism and Humanism, to advance an argu-
ment that the freedom we should choose as our primary value is not 
just our own individual freedom but the freedom of all. " I am obliged 
to will the freedom of others at the same time as mine", he states. This 
is because, "In willing freedom, we discover that it depends entirely on 
the freedom of others and that the freedom of others depends on our 
own" (Sartre 1973: 51-2). In the practical order, it is obvious that both 
the range of options available to our free choice as well as our freedom 
to attain the goals we choose are heavily dependent on the choices 
and actions of others. Sartre focuses especially on the psychological 
interdependency of human beings. Only humans can confer value on 
my life. For me to obtain the fullest possible meaning and value for my 
life, then, I need other free subjects to freely confer positive value on 
me. Of course, each person can choose to value his/her life and that is 
important. Still that is value from only one freedom and, Sartre suggests, 
I both desire and can attain far more meaning if others also positively 
value me (Sartre 1992: 282-4, 499-500). Now if I positively value their 
freedom, instead of ignoring or oppressing it, it is more likely that they 
will reciprocate with a favourable evaluation of mine. Another sugges-
tion (and it is only that) that Sartre offers is that I particularly want 
meaning and value given to me by those who freely choose to affirm 
me. Recognition from a vassal or slave is not worth nearly as much as 
authentic love freely bestowed. Thus I should will others' freedoms so 
that the value and meaning they freely give to me and my life wiU be 
favourable and wiU be from a source that I myself consider valuable. 
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I personally think these are solid arguments but I must point out 
that once again they require that one value logical consistency and 
consistency with reality, the reality that all value and meaning come 
from human freedoms. Simply put, Sartre's argument, even though 
he doesn' t say so explicitly, appears to be that it is " inconsistent" for 
me to desire a fully meaningful life and at the same time not value the 
many freedoms which are the only sources of meaning and value for 
my life. But, to repeat my earlier objection, consistency itself possesses 
no intrinsic or objective value in the early Sartre's ontology. Further-
more, it still remains vague just what it means in the practical order 
to value the freedom of others. Surely I am not to value the freedom 
of everyone (including Hitler and Stalin) and support whatever goals 
they freely choose. 
As for the second ethics, although neither in the Rome lecture nor 
any other later work does Sartre explicitly construct an argument to 
demonstrate that we should seek the fulfilment of others, not just of 
ourselves, the notion of human interdependency remains central to 
his thought. In rus last major work, The Family Idiot, which he says 
contains "concrete morality", he emphasizes the needs human beings 
have for each other, in particular their needs for love. 
If an infant is loved by his mother, Sartre generalizes from his study 
of Gustave Flaubert, he experiences hjmself to be of value and becomes 
valuable to himself. "The first interest he [the infant] attaches to his 
person is derived from the care whose object he is", Sartre writes; "If 
the mother loves him, in other words, he gradually discovers rus being-
an-object as his being-loved . . . [and] he becomes a value in his own 
eyes" (Sartre 1987: 129, n. 2). 
Even a human being's awareness that he or she is a free agent capable 
of acting on the world to fulfil his or her needs is totally dependent on 
others, Sartre says. We also need the love of others to assure us that 
we have something worth doing, a mission in life, a reason for being: 
"Briefly, the love of the Other is the foundation and guarantee of the 
objectivity of the individual's value and his mission" (ibid.: 135). More 
than any other work of his, The Family Idiot describes in great detail the 
overwhelming need human beings have to be valued and loved by others 
and thus their complete dependence on each other to achieve human 
fulfilment. And in no other work did Sartre push human dependency 
and conditioning so deep, into infancy. In its own way his last major 
work demonstrates the need to liberate human beings &om human 
relationships and structures that prevent them from becoming fully 
human- beginning in infancy. Towards the end of his study of Flaubert, 
Sartre refers to what he calls "true humanism" which he says involves 
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human beings working together to "in stitute a new order that is proper 
to man". "True humanism", which is apparently the morality of the 
second ethics, "should take these [needs] as its starting point and never 
deviate from them" (Sartre 1991a: 263~). Such humanism, he states, 
can only be built upon our mutual recognition of our common human 
needs and our common "right" to their satisfaction (Sartre 1987: 413). 
Conclusion 
I have tried to set forth the characteristics of Sartre's second (dialec-
tical) ethics by contrasting it with his first attempt at ethics. I have 
argued that Sartre is correct in believing that the second ethics makes 
significant improvements over the first. Its goal- humans with needs 
fulfilled- contains far more content than the freedom of all of the first. 
Also, by rooting human values in human needs it provides them with 
a more objective character and so overcomes the radically subjective 
nature that values have in the first. The second ethics also provides a 
much more solid justification for making human fulfilment its primary 
value and goaJ by rooting all values in human needs. The fi rst ethics 
cannot ultimately justify making the freedom of all (or anything else) 
its primary value. Finally by its deep account of the human need for 
love, the second ethics offers a greater understanding of the thorough 
dependence of human beings on each o ther and, consequently, their 
need to seek the fulfilment of the needs of all. 
In one of his last interviews, he expressed himself especially force-
fully on this point. We must create a society, he states, "in which we can 
live for others and for ourselves", which requires that we " try to learn 
that one can only seek his being, his life, in living for others" (Anderson 
1993 : 172). "In that lies the truth", he adds, " there is no other" (ibid.). 
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